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Abstract 
 
The blockchain technology offers a novel mode of 
distributed authentication, which does not depend on a 
central authority. We consider this novelty against estab-
lished governance modes. We illustrate our argument by 
paying special attention to blockchain-based authentica-
tion functions in the empirical domain of land registries 
across the world. Based on interviews with representa-
tives from organizations deploying blockchain, and con-
tent analysis of related grey literature, we discuss estab-
lished governance idealtypes against what the rivalry 
that cryptocurrencies and blockchains bring to digital 
settings. After referring to market, hierarchy, network, 
and bazaar, we conclude outlining the prospects of a dif-
ferent, blockchain-related governance mode called 
‘tribal’ that better captures the ‘togetherness’ which ri-
valry originates. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If one copies and distributes music, it is still music. If 
one can copy and distribute money, it is not money any-
more. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin proved at scale 
blockchain functionalities, which introduce rivalry into 
digital environments via distributed authentication. This 
capacity of authentication is relevant for governance pur-
poses because it introduces a sense of togetherness due 
to shared interest. This is different from other infor-
mation goods and the organizational forms they brought 
about. 
Rather than grounded theorizing, or taking its move 
from existing blockchain literature - which is reviewed 
in the following paragraph - this article aims at problem-
atizing the well-established typology of modes of gov-
ernance initiated by Williamson [1] and Powell [2] on 
the basis of the emerging phenomenon of blockchains. 
More precisely, the bazaar governance [3], which for-
malizes digital governance defined by openness and non-
rivalry of information goods and exemplified by free and 
open source software (FOSS), is considered under the 
light of blockchain architectures and their consequences 
in use. We argue that the bazaar misses relevant aspects 
of blockchain-related phenomena. On the basis of this 
mismatch and illustrations from empirical domains, we 
propose a different mode of governance which we name 
‘tribal’. The reference to tribes accounts both for a mode 
of governance not defined by the rule of law, and for the 
togetherness that rivalry introduces into the open and 
common pastures of digital fields. 
In the research domain about governance through IT, 
as distinct from governance of IT, this paper looks at the 
former and takes a narrow focus on authentication. Au-
thentication is here intended in its basic meaning of cer-
tification of genuinity. Against the background of infor-
mation openness and abundance, typical of open infor-
mation infrastructures, we claim that the major infor-
mation management innovation introduced by block-
chain - and proved viable at scale by Bitcoin - is distrib-
uted authentication. We illustrate it relying on cases of 
actual implementations for land registration. 
In open networks like the internet, the governance 
problem is at the fringes. Since there is no way to seal 
boundaries to define who is in and who is out, then to 
control them, open networks are constantly exposed to 
malicious actors. So, openness is generative both of in-
novations and misconducts [4]. This polarization de-
pends on architectural openness and on nearly zero mar-
ginal cost for replication and distribution, which in turn 
made IT unsuitable for native digital money (i.e. without 
external and non-digital guarantor). That is because, of 
course, money must not be replicable (i.e. counterfeita-
ble).  
The blockchain circumvents this limit of IT and 
brings rivalry into the digital environment. It proved ri-
valry viable by making transactions public and by letting 
the 51% of computing power (there are alternatives) to 
authenticate honest transactions. In practice, Bitcoins (or 
tokens more generally) cannot be replicated because au-
thenticated transactions locate any token and differenti-
ate it from any other. From another angle, Bitcoin tested 
at scale a rewarding mechanism for keeping faceless and 
globally dispersed actors honest when operating on this 
open network. For such reasons, open (often referred to 
as ‘permissionless’) blockchains are particularly interest-
ing for governance issues: they promise to scale easily 
for positive network externalities, but they are difficult to 
manage because of lack of both formal organizational 
structures and boundaries to police. 
We place our interest in governance through block-
chain against the broader background of progressive de-
coupling of formal organizations and large information 
systems (or information infrastructures). For instance, 
cloud computing has taken the control on IT out of IT 
departments’ hands. Regarding blockchain, this move is 
well exemplified by the independence of cryptocurren-
cies from nation-states and central banks. 
To support the claim for a new governance mode 
brought to the fore by blockchain implementations, the 
remainder is organized as follows: first we identify the 
cornerstones of our theoretical framework. It takes its 
moves from studies on IT governance, then presents the 
bazaar as a recent extension of the well-established 
modes of governance typology by Powell [2]. We dis-
cuss the peculiarities that blockchain introduces against 
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these established idealtypes, with a special attention for 
the bazaar. In particular, we highlight how the rivalry that 
blockchains introduce into digital environments origi-
nates a level of ‘togetherness’ among blockchain users 
that does not manifest in information goods and native 
digital organizing modes like FOSS. Then, after present-
ing the main works on actual implementations of block-
chains, we outline our research methodology. The paper 
continues with an illustration of blockchain implementa-
tions in the domain of land registries. In conclusion, we 
discuss a mode of governance, which we name ‘tribal’, 
that may better account for digital organizing when ri-
valry plays a relevant role.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
As anticipated, the new architecture introduced and 
tested at scale by Bitcoin is about authenticating transac-
tions, thus certifying the reliability of it as a public ledger. 
From another perspective, blockchains introduce rivalry 
in the online domain: to avoid the double-spending prob-
lem, each token of a currency must be identifiable and 
owned by someone and not anyone else at the same time. 
The opening example clarifies: if I pass a music file on 
to someone else, we both can listen to it and it remains 
music. Instead, if we both can own the same bitcoin, it 
would not work as money anymore.  
The digitally native way of authenticating something 
introduces rivalry and constitutes a qualitative shift in 
digital environments. Copies are not all the same as they 
used to be. This is fostered by the open nature of the 
Bitcoin blockchain where no single node can be held ac-
countable due to its distributed nature [5, 6]. Traditional 
jurisdictions thereby may act as a mediating entity in 
case of disputes only to the extent concerned parties ac-
cept it. Since jurisdictions have never been intended as a 
service to use as one pleases, basic questions about what 
social contract underpins blockchain organizing forms 
are legit to ask [7].  
The term IT Governance has been used since the 
early 1990s [8, 9] and became more prominent later in 
the decade [10], [11], [12]. Later, IT governance was de-
fined by Weill and Ross [13] as the framework for deci-
sion rights and accountabilities to encourage desirable 
behavior in the use of IT. In Weill and Ross’s [13] frame-
work, political idealtypes are used to describe how peo-
ple in the enterprise make key decisions. Their quite ar-
ticulated conceptualization is too precise, thus inflexible, 
to be applicable to blockchains, especially permission-
less, which remain in constant flux, do not have actors in 
the position of fully exercising decision rights, nor clear 
mechanisms and rules to achieve objectives (a clear ex-
ample is the never-ending unruly conflict about Bitcoin 
blocksize). So, while we maintain our focus on IT and 
governance, we need to move to theories that relate more 
to actual use. 
The recent book by Musiani et al. [14] looks at so-
cial and political sciences to account both for the elusive-
ness to control that the Internet and the services based on 
it showed to traditional decision makers, and for new 
ways power is being exercised through IT. The spectrum 
of positions about IT and governance is wide and spans 
from traditional managerial command and control ap-
proaches to international anarchy. Such diversity sug-
gests that there are basic differences about the under-
standing of what IT are and how to govern through them. 
So, we turn our attention to a classic of organization stud-
ies: Powell [2], in order to introduce and problematize 
the ‘bazaar governance’ [3]. 
 
2.1. From Hierarchy to Bazaar Governance 
According to Williamson [15] “governance is a 
means by which to infuse order in a relation where po-
tential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to 
realize mutual gains”. Williamson’s [1, 15, 16] core the-
oretical stance is that transactions entail uncertainty 
about their outcome, due to the bounded rationality and 
opportunism of agents. Thus, and as a means of reducing 
transaction costs, agents implement a governance struc-
ture, which Williamson defined as “the explicit or im-
plicit contractual framework within which a transaction 
is located” quoted in [3]. This line of thinking is ex-
panded by Watson et al. [17] who discuss it in digital do-
mains, with an argument consistent to Surowiecki [18] 
‘Wisdom of the Crowds’, informed by cases like FOSS, 
Wikipedia and the likes. 
As summarized in table 1, hierarchy refers to formal 
organizations within which command lines and respon-
sibilities are defined and stable. Market refers to atomic 
actors who freely trade. As Williamson [16] put it: “firms 
are islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market 
relations.” Powell [2] picked on this dichotomy and ar-
gued that market logics may operate within hierarchies 
(incentives, for instance) and hierarchies onto markets. 
So, he proposed the network as a new idealtype, which 
is most suited to domains where measurements are diffi-
cult and trust among parties has a paramount role.  
Demil and Lecocq’s [3] study proposes to add a 
fourth idealtype, named ‘bazaar governance’, to Pow-
ell’s [2] tripartite categorization of governance forms. 
Their work, based on FOSS production, found that Pow-
ell’s threefold characterization was not satisfactory to ex-
plain the then booming phenomenon of FOSS, and by 
extension the information economy, so they proposed 
the bazaar idealtype. 
FOSS took the hegemony over the internet not only 
by ignoring much of the received wisdom about IT gov-
ernance, but also projecting the possibilities of open col-
laboration beyond software development. For instance, 
voluntary geographic information (and user-generated 
content more broadly) has shown that formal expert or-
ganizations are not the only way of getting things done; 
consumer electronics and open internet services have re-
placed business technologies in leading the ways of in-
novation; crowdfunding has unveiled the blindspots of 
traditional investors’ preferences.  
. 
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Table 1. Governance idealtypes adapted from Powell [2] and Demil and Lecocq [3]. The last column in italics on the right is an anticipation of our 
proposal for a novel governance idealtype which we named ‘tribal’. It is discussed in the last part of this paper.   
 
These peculiarities of digital governance are for-
malized by Demil and Lecocq, who relied on the initial 
ideas by Raymond [19]. Indeed, the label bazaar de-
rives from Raymond’s [19] work who contrasted it to 
the traditional approach to software development, lik-
ened to a ‘cathedral’. 
The bazaar mode of governance is defined by 
open licenses, which allow unrestricted access to the 
source code and prevent anyone to appropriate and 
trade on software ownership. This reduces substan-
tially the transaction cost of FOSS. The consequent 
governance mode is based on openness and transpar-
ency: software developers build up their reputation, 
which they can then spend providing assistance on the 
software they know [20]. Overall, like in a bazaar, both 
direct incentives and controls are low. In fact, the ba-
zaar clearly differs from hierarchies because there are 
no defined organizational structures along which com-
mand and control lines can be used to regulate behav-
iors. It also differs from markets because open source 
licenses do not grant anyone with exclusive ownership 
rights, thus software cannot be traded as a commodity 
for direct profit. Finally, it differs from networks be-
cause membership and associations are fluid, and se-
lection does not happen at the entry points. 
Since their study pinpoints to some peculiarities of 
digital organizing, we thought of studying to what ex-
tend the bazaar helps explaining another rapidly 
emerging phenomenon: blockchains. We found 
strengths and weaknesses. In the first place, we find 
that their focus on transaction cost and copyleft as a pe-
culiar kind of contract are reductive. Rivalry and trust 
appear, respectively, more prominent. 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Based on Demil and Lecocq [3]: In classical contract law, 
transacting parties identity is irrelevant and their dependence 
slight. 
 
2.2. Authentication and Rivalry  
Like any other FOSS project, the source code of 
most blockchain software is publicly available for any-
one to check, use, develop and redistribute it. In spite 
of these apparent similarities, there are remarkable dif-
ferences between open-source applications like web 
browsers or word processors and blockchains. Block-
chains, by authenticating some data against the rest, in-
troduce rivalry to the digital environment, which has 
always been characterized by infinite replicability, thus 
plentitude. In short, before the blockchain, all copies 
were the same. With blockchain it has become possible 
to differentiate something from something else (like 
who owns a bitcoin) without relying on non-digital au-
thorities. This property of the blockchains underneath 
cryptocurrencies is allowing to move from openness 
and gift economy, well exemplified by FOSS, to a dig-
itally native economy, at the expenses of the non-ri-
valry that used to characterize information goods. This 
establishes a novel link between distributed authentica-
tion and modes of governance. 
Concretely, if at some point any open source web 
browser users is dissatisfied with the software, they can 
decide to fork the code and develop an independent 
version to fit their own and new users’ preferences. 
When this happens, users of both versions maintain the 
capacity to use their software for most if not all brows-
ing purposes. This is not the case with blockchains, 
whose main purpose is to guarantee the authenticity of 
the data they gather. When a fork takes place, data on 
the forked ledgers may differ and the reliability they 
offer be hampered [21]. 
To clarify this point, let us consider the most de-
veloped blockchain: Bitcoin. All Bitcoin transactions 
are authenticated and recorded on one public ledger 
maintained by all miners. Because of the increasing 
2 Further [3]: In neoclassical contracts, hybrid organizations re-
main autonomous but bilaterally dependent and their identities 
matters. 
Features Explanation Market Hierarchy Network Bazaar Tribal 
Contract 
Framework 
Legal framework for 
transaction 
Classical 
contract
1
 
Employment 
contract 
Neoclassical 
contract
2
 
Open license con-
tract 
(Until now) Post-hoc: a 
record if/when needed 
Coordination 
Mechanism 
Means of governing 
exchanges 
Price 
Formal line 
of authority 
Embedded 
relations 
Product 
Adherence to the technical 
protocol 
Normative ba-
sis 
Main regulatory 
force 
Market 
exchanges 
Forbearance Exchanges 
Openness and fair-
ness 
Consensus-based 
Identity of par-
ties 
Degree to which 
identity of parties 
matters 
Irrelevant Irrelevant Relevant Partially relevant Pseudonym-based 
Nature of in-
centives 
Incentives for trans-
acting parties 
Competi-
tion 
Status Reciprocity Reputation 
Hoarding (for currencies) 
Reliability (for records) 
Incentives In-
tensity 
Agent’s motivation 
to contribute 
High Low Intermediate Low High 
Control Inten-
sity 
Capacity to enforce 
regulations 
Low High Intermediate Low 
Low from the outside 
Intermediate from inside 
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number of Bitcoin transactions, the blockchain mani-
fested bottlenecks in authenticating all of them in a 
timely fashion. Some developers have proposed solv-
ing this problem by modifying the software to increase 
the blocksize, but the miners who were making money 
out of the high transaction costs granted by the status 
quo, opposed it. Unlike with the web browser example, 
this is where Bitcoin manifests a substantive mismatch 
with the bazaar idealtype: miners have a prominent role 
in maintaining network integrity and reliability, so they 
have unprecedented power. Indeed, the fork of the soft-
ware, which happened in August 2017, created two dis-
tinct blockchains each one maintained by different 
miners. Bitcoins attached to one cannot be traded on 
the other any longer. Whereas a forked browser is usa-
ble for the whole Web. So, while forked browsers re-
tain their use value quite independently from the fork 
size, Bitcoin use value depends on mining capacity and 
trade mass. Hence, compared to FOSS projects, public 
distributed ledgers show a level of togetherness that af-
fects all involved actors (end users, miners, companies, 
regulators, etc.). This togetherness is more defining 
than open licenses, which define the bazaar idealtype. 
These differences from FOSS are explained by the 
actors involved and the rules governing their relation-
ships. Bitcoin involves a number of significant players 
that together guarantee its blockchain consistency 
across time and space. First, a relatively small group of 
core developers is responsible for new code; this is 
common to FOSS. Second, a relatively large number 
of miners authenticate transactions so they are properly 
executed and no double spending is allowed. Then, 
there are the many users who trade in Bitcoin and may 
have little knowledge or interest into its underlying 
functioning. Still, by trading fiat money for Bitcoins, 
they affect massively its valuation level, thus the finan-
cial incentives for everyone involved. Therefore, even 
if copyleft licenses are adopted for blockchains, they 
are not as determinant for governance as Demil and 
Lecocq [3] claim they are for other FOSS projects. 
Secondly, the centrality that Demil and Lecocq [3] 
accord to transaction cost economics does not seem to 
explain relevant aspects of blockchains. Starting from 
Williamson [1], Demil and Lecocq [3] pose central at-
tention onto the transaction cost economics, which dis-
criminates between market and hierarchy. Even though 
from other empirical domains, studies like Lucas and 
Goh [22] as well as Garud and Munir [23] pose doubts 
on emphasizing transaction cost. Trust was argued to 
be central in networks and bazaar. In spite of recurrent 
references to trustless transactions, we see trust as cen-
tral for blockchains as well. This is explored in the fol-
lowing paragraph. 
 
2.3. Faceless Trust  
Both the network and the bazaar modes of govern-
ance exceed the hierarchical and market modes of reg-
ulation and are explanatory of cases where trust plays 
an important role. Trust is given paramount relevance 
in Powell’s networks as the glue that guarantees reci-
procity. Trust is a key factor and is also described as the 
primary governance mechanism for dyadic or network 
exchange relationships [2]. Trust does not only mini-
mize transaction costs, but also creates value (with en-
hanced information sharing) for such relationship [24]. 
The reputational nature of bazaar incentives works 
only to the extent participants trust a fair allocation of 
resources down the line. 
Rivalry might make think that actors do not trust 
each other, nor the whole system. This stance is mis-
leading. It is not uncommon to read claims that block-
chains are trustless. This proves quite narrow if one 
considers that no one is forced to use blockchains. So, 
users and/or organizations do trust them to the extent 
they use them, including pouring real money. In per-
missioned blockchain trust is, at the very least, posed 
in those who are in charge of policing the access points. 
Having said that, it is reasonable to accept that block-
chain introduces a way to trade without intermediaries 
with unknown people, whom we may not trust individ-
ually. This is what we call faceless trust. 
We turn to Gambetta’s [25] formalization of the 
concept of trust, quoted by Lustig and Nardi [26], to 
conceptualize it as a central concepts for blockchain-
related governance. According to him, trust is the sub-
jective sense that one has about another performing a 
particular course of action, with consequences for the 
former, without being monitored. Trust is, therefore, 
there to bridge over the uncertainty about the future 
[27]. Trust in authenticity of transactions reduce the re-
liance on traders’ subjectivity. 
Although trust appears central for blockchains, 
there are no studies yet that focus on the mutual rela-
tions between blockchains and trust. Blockchain tech-
nology refers to transfer of trust from offline to online 
domain, or to the emergence of trustworthy relations 
where there were none or weak. In contrast to classical 
way of perceiving trust in online relationships [28], 
trust in blockchain technology does not require third-
party guarantees or any third party at all. Therefore, 
blockchain-enabled trust can be seen as faceless, mean-
ing that there is no actor who plays the role of a trustee. 
The tribal governance mode we propose offers a frame-
work for future studies in this direction. 
 
3. Current Research on Blockchain in Use 
 
In recent years, Bitcoin first and blockchains later 
have attracted wide-spread interest [31]. Of course, 
computer scientists have been first movers to approach 
this emerging phenomenon and proposing many vari-
ants of the architecture concept outlined by Nakamoto 
[32]. In defining this literature review, we were inter-
ested in blockchains in actual use, not in publications 
outlining the potentials of this new architecture, or pos-
sible improvements. Since empirical studies are still 
sparse, our selection criterion left us with a relatively 
small number of works to consider: not least because 
of the long-time cycle of implementing IT, studying it, 
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and going through peer-review processes, we could not 
find much academic literature based on studies of actu-
ally implemented and used blockchains in real-life set-
tings. Consequently, despite our keen intention of dif-
ferentiating between speculations about the potentials 
of blockchain and actual uses, it was often difficult to 
discriminate between what was aimed at by designers 
and researchers from what was happening in practice.  
Utilizing blockchains comes with the trust, or just 
the assumption, in algorithms and their capacity of 
governing organizational relations. Along this line, 
Lustig and Nardi [26] dive into the Bitcoin phenome-
non to investigate how algorithms have gained author-
ity and legitimation in directing human activities by de-
fining what information we rely upon. They criticize, 
like Dodd [33] does, the emic views of people promot-
ing Bitcoin for their naive assumptions about techno-
logical neutrality and independence from allegedly 
corrupted politics. A similar approach can be seen in 
the discussion on blockchain-based state governance 
[34, 35]. Even if we agree that algorithms are not neu-
tral in transforming human behaviors, organizations, 
and societies, we find that a narrow focus on algorithms 
does not account for novel aspects that blockchains 
bring to the fore. Thus, this article takes a different 
starting point: the rivalry that the blockchain architec-
ture introduces by means of authentication, which min-
ers maintain, and users rely upon and reinforce by us-
ing blockchains. Indeed, if we considered algorithms 
solely, we would not see much difference between 
open source software and blockchains, and the authen-
tication they bring about by relying on miners and trad-
ers. This distinction is expanded upon later, when lim-
its of the bazaar idealtype are discussed and tribal gov-
ernance introduced. 
Studies about governance often discuss issues of 
jurisdiction, which remains uncertain here because the 
responsibility for the genuinity of transactions has 
shifted to allegedly independent miners or other con-
sensus methods, which are located outside of formal 
organizations’ and jurisdictions’ reach, which, there-
fore, are not easy to be held accountable [36]. As a con-
sequence, legal uncertainty in transactions increases. A 
way to mitigate this uncertainty are so-called smart 
contracts, which gained popularity as well as contro-
versy.  
Traditional contracts reduce uncertainty by com-
mitting all signatories, who remain subject to the rule 
of law. But blockchain may exceed jurisdictions, thus 
fall in the cracks between inconsistent jurisdictions. 
Dupont and Maurer [37] reflect on the applicability of 
smart contracts and their relationship to law. It is 
claimed that distributed, autonomous, and self-execut-
ing contracts are not feasible due to their non-contrac-
tual basis. Durkheim argues: “Wherever a contract ex-
ists, it is subject to regulation, which is the work of so-
ciety and not of individuals”. Smart contracts are not 
contracts, they are rather automatisms built on the top 
of blockchain authentication [37]. Even if there is a 
growing interest for smart contracts, we marginally 
consider them here since they are envisioned as a layer 
on the top of blockchains. 
Morabito et al. [39] offer the most exhaustive over-
view of the state-of-the-art of blockchain in organiza-
tions. The salient cases presented there are Coinbase, 
Everledger, Factom, eHealth and electricity manage-
ment applications, finance and smart-contracts. Those 
case-studies were useful to us navigating and putting in 
perspective materials about the actual implementations 
we found, and to decide who to contact directly. Inter-
estingly, blockchain architecture is believed to fit into 
fundamentally different domains in terms of scope or 
transactional volume: from land registries to supply 
chain management systems, from intellectual property 
right management to money transfers and payments. In 
all those domains, the incumbents are intermediaries or 
third-party guarantors, which the blockchains aim at 
substituting. 
Walsh et al. [38] conducted a literature review to 
gain an overview of blockchain characteristics, a nec-
essary step to define blockchain types. Key blockchain 
characteristics are: level of permission, restriction of 
public access to data, modes of consensus, modularity, 
scalability, interoperability, anonymity. Four possible 
types emerge: Decentralized/Extensible (Bitcoin), De-
centralized/Inextensible (Counterparty), Central-
ized/Extensible (Ripple), and Centralized/Inextensible 
(R3). Empirical investigation is expected to uncover a 
number of operational issues associated with different 
types, e.g. issues of governance, political aspirations, 
control, risk and resistance to change from those con-
tinuing to use traditional systems.  
We could group other contributions according to 
their focus on public services or private sector. From 
the former, a case study in healthcare by  Ekblaw et al. 
[40] analyzes MedRec, a system that gives patients a 
comprehensive, immutable log and easy access to their 
medical information across providers and treatment 
sites. Leveraging a blockchain, MedRec manages au-
thentication, confidentiality, accountability, and data 
sharing, all crucial considerations when handling 
health data.  
In the private sector, certainly the most developed 
domain is finance, not least because of the Bitcoin ex-
perience. Morisse [41] surveys 42 papers about crypto-
currencies in terms of methods, concepts, and ap-
proaches and finds that cryptocurrencies had not 
reached IS research, at least in 2015. Studies on secu-
rity were more receptive of this emerging phenome-
non. Herbert and Litchfield [42] research the applica-
tion of property rights in the case of blockchain-based 
software piracy prevention. Karame et al. [5] analyze 
the probability of double-spending on the Bitcoin 
blockchain and claim that the current Bitcoin log does 
not provide sufficient information to provide sufficient 
accountability, which would facilitate to blacklist ma-
licious nodes.  
Overall, Morabito et al. [39] warns about the risks 
of privatizing state functions through blockchains as 
Page 4488
Tribal Governance: The Business of Blockchain Authentication - Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 2018 
6 
 
they contribute to “a process of undermining public in-
stitutions, the superiority of economics over politics, 
and the change of citizens into to customers (…), 
which perpetually empowers markets to the disad-
vantage of citizens”, which is in line with Atzori [34]. 
 
4. Method and Data Collection 
 
Blockchain is a new technology and only recently 
it has started to become applied outside the cryptocur-
rencies domain. Thus, it is time now to explore new 
phenomena emerging when blockchains are being ap-
plied to societal and business problems. Blockchain 
governance is such a new phenomenon. It is time to 
check whether old models of how business is con-
ducted, organized and governed appropriately describe 
and explain blockchain-related governance. For this 
matter, we reviewed related research with empirical 
components, categorized blockchain-based companies 
in their intentions to use blockchains, and conducted 
semi-structured expert interviews to consequently de-
rive blockchain governance characteristics and to con-
trast them to governance idealtypes.  
 As typical for exploratory research [43, 44], we 
used all available sources to uncover interesting phe-
nomena and derive appropriate concepts to describe 
them. Specifically, we reviewed the still scarce, but 
rapidly growing scientific body of work for reports on 
blockchain governance, alongside scanning more than 
six hundred sources for related materials obtained from 
the blockchain research project Coding Value, as well 
as research databases and search engines such as Sco-
pus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar among oth-
ers. We utilized various search strings consisting of 
‘blockchain’ and ‘governance’ to ensure a wider cov-
erage of research domains, such as organizational and 
social sciences. This initial step serves as a precondi-
tion to frame Powell’s and Demil and Lecocq’s classi-
fication of governance idealtypes and research on 
blockchain governance characteristics from an aca-
demic standpoint. All publications without reference to 
blockchains in use have been disregarded because out-
side of the scope of this work. 
To complement our literature review from an aca-
demic side with practitioner’s intention to use block-
chains, we also analyzed 126 blockchain-based com-
panies from a variety of online sources like Crunchbase 
and Coindesk for their governance characteristics. 
Identifying relevant cases has proved a difficult task 
because of the novelty of this domain and the hype that 
wraps it. Indeed, there are countless startups, initia-
tives, GitHub projects, but few running implementa-
tions, which also causes empirically grounded research 
to be scarce. In sum, our data collection is based on pa-
pers, practitioners’ reports, grey literature, specialized 
press, blogs, as well as insights we gained from expert 
interviews.  
Through our search for blockchain-based compa-
nies, we found the most advanced application domains 
to be (1) financial solutions, like wallets and payments, 
(2) digital identity of legal persons or tangible as well 
as non-tangible assets, and (3) infrastructure provision 
of data and transaction storage. In more detail, supply 
chains, intellectual property rights, land registries, and 
micro transactions are those areas where applications 
have been released to "the wild". While we have sys-
tematically studied a total of two dozen applications in 
four domains, space restrictions allow us only to de-
scribe the domain of land registries in this paper. Here, 
we complemented a review of practitioner-based liter-
ature with interviews with high tier executives. 
Scientific publications, practitioner’s reports, and 
the interview data were fed into an iterative sense-mak-
ing process: the authors coded and conceptualized the 
information individually. Codes were initially seeded 
by using concepts characterizing established govern-
ance mechanisms (i.e. market, hierarchy, network, ba-
zaar). These individually gathered insights were then 
discussed by all authors. We also exposed immediate 
results and sought for input from the Coding Value re-
search project. This input was then used to revisit the 
data and further develop our concepts. The highest 
level conceptual results is depicted in table 1 above, 
where we contrast established governance mechanisms 
with tribal governance. This iterative approach was fin-
ished when theoretical saturation was reached.  
 
5. Blockchain-based Land Registry 
 
In the following, we present the business of au-
thentication in the real-life domain of land registries. 
Land registry received attention at the World Eco-
nomic Forum [45], especially for the long time-span 
that they must cover. Table 2 below lists the main cases 
we found and their main references. 
Table 2. Overview of found land registry cases 
Case Location References 
A West Africa [46, 47] 
B Caribbean [48–50] 
C Scandinavia [51–53] 
D Caucasus [54, 55] 
 
All these cases officially announced projects to 
store and transfer records of land ownership via block-
chain – some projects are already piloted and being 
tested (A and C), other states already announced to join 
(e.g. Dubai). Land registry and transfer of ownership, 
historically, are perceived as bureaucratic and costly, 
involving an authorized third party, e.g. notary services 
and state bodies, to seal those transactions and to main-
tain the records for generations to come. The 
bookkeeping often relies on paper-based documenta-
tion, which promises longevity and reliability. It comes 
as no surprise that mostly, but not only, developing 
countries put a special emphasis on this matter. Land 
tenure is indeed seen as basic for further economic de-
velopment, including financializing through collat-
erals. Assets as lands are both valuable and necessary, 
thereby lucrative for fraud or corruption. Fraudulent 
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renting, expropriations, extortion, and bribery are as 
well documented as corruption in dealing with govern-
mental or notary third parties [49, 54, 56].  
In the case of A, a country in West Africa, the 
blockchain project is part of an overall state digitization 
initiative which aims at creating a novel eco-system, 
connecting notaries, state, investors, and citizens. Land 
records ambiguity and corruption have motivated this 
initiative. Their implementation partner is active in 
more than five countries and maintains more than one 
thousand land records at the time of writing. This 
blockchain-based solution is quite original: it authenti-
cates transactions with proof-of-stake, which is faster 
and cheaper than Bitcoin’s mining-intensive proof-of-
work. It also links its own tokens to both permissioned 
and permissionless blockchains to leverage their differ-
ent properties. In practice, to ensure the system’s resil-
ience against tampering, each token is linked to Bitcoin 
blockchain, whose scale guaranties proof-of-existence, 
and a storage chain, where to save actual records data. 
Responsible for data entry is a partnership between 
state authorities and notaries, who can also modify 
claimed contentious data and thereby acts as a single 
‘point of truth’. The authentication of records therefore 
partly relies both on open infrastructures and local ac-
tors (both state and private). 
Case B targets a prototype in a Caribbean country 
which can be considered as first-mover in blockchain-
based land registry. Consistently with the idea that 
blockchains may have positive effects where other 
modes of governance encountered problems, this coun-
try has gone through decades of failed land reforms be-
fore trying this technology. The World Bank has been 
active here for decades and this project can be seen a 
recent development of a long-term international pres-
ence. The implementation partner is US-based and ap-
plies his offering to various domains beyond land reg-
istries, which means that, differently from case A, the 
solution is less tailored onto the specific application 
and the social context of use. Same as in case A, record 
ambiguity and officials’ corruption were the main 
driver for this initiative. Starting with a proof-of-con-
cept in 2015, the project has been stalled shortly after 
its announcements due to political issues (reelection) 
and is currently regaining pace. Similarly, to case A, 
the state of B remains the ‘single point of truth’ regard-
ing data entry but it may have easier access to modifi-
cation of records because all nodes of the permissioned 
blockchain used, run, at the time of writing, on servers 
belonging to a single organization. Originally, this 
blockchain relies on proof-of-burn, which facilitates 
the control on frequent changes of the records, also 
traced on Bitcoin blockchain.  
The project regarding case C in Scandinavia 
started in 2016 and includes the state land registry of-
fice, a consultancy, a telecommunications provider, a 
blockchain-based implementation partner, and finan-
cial institutions. Long term national efforts for the dig-
itization of state services have been the main motiva-
tion for undertaking land registry and facilitate digital 
and secure ownership transfers. At the time of writing, 
the project finished its second test run. From a technical 
perspective, data entry and changes are decided upon 
by the state authority in a permissioned blockchain 
which is embedded in the existing spatial data infra-
structure, also comprising the cadaster. The authentic-
ity of records is thereby solely dependent on the state 
and its infrastructure, in contrast to case A and B, and 
does therefore not rely on record maintenance provided 
by independent miners like Bitcoin blockchain’s. The 
goal to make information available to affiliated, au-
thenticated parties is eased by the utilization of elec-
tronic ID’s provided by the telecommunication pro-
vider, and apparently in conformity to EU regulations.  
The state of D, whose territory and sovereignty 
have been under threat, is known for its e-government 
efforts especially in collaboration with international 
agencies. It partnered up in 2016 with a US-based im-
plementation partner in order to increase land record 
reliability. This implementation shows similar traits as 
case A and B, relying on a permissioned blockchain 
which is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain using dis-
tributed digital timestamping. This might be particu-
larly important in case of occupation. Still, the state, 
again, remains responsible for these foundational data 
entry, while the Bitcoin's proof-of-work assures data 
integrity.  
 
6. A Proposal for Tribal Governance 
 
The domains of blockchains applications that we 
considered (money transfer, intellectual property rights 
management, supply chain monitoring), and the spe-
cific illustration provided above from land registries, 
show some basic differences between blockchain gov-
ernance and the bazaar idealtype (also refer to the 
idealtypes in table 1): 
• Contrary to open source licenses that prevent anyone 
to appropriate the “matter of trade” (i.e. the devel-
oped software), public ledgers introduce authentica-
tion into digital settings. So we move from ‘carrots 
and rainbows’ [20] to rivalry;  
• While in FOSS projects the majority cannot enforce 
its decisions onto everyone, because anyone can fork 
their own version relying on publicly available code 
at low cost while preserving their own use value, in 
blockchain matters majority decisions are enforced 
and forking poses substantial costs on all users; 
• Cryptocurrencies or other built-in blockchain re-
warding schemes affect people’s involvement not 
least because they trade and hoard tokens. This is not 
a feature of other FOSS projects; 
• Derived from the previous points, blockchains man-
ifest a level of mutually dependent interest, thus or-
ganizational togetherness, that the bazaar idealtype 
does not accounts for. 
The blockchain architecture thereby marks a par-
adigm shift in two ways: a) from traditional and cen-
tralized to digital and (currently) decentralized authen-
tication method, and also b) from a digital gift economy 
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to digital-only trades. This is new because before it, one 
could only rely on credit money or had to do things for 
free, trusting in a gift economy. A third option, i.e. both 
digital native and paid directly, is allowed by distrib-
uted authentication of transactions, which introduces 
rivalry in the digital environment. In other words, au-
thentication allows an alternative to the gift economy 
without having to rely on external guarantors. 
While we maintain that digital modes of govern-
ance present substantial differences from previous 
ones, we find the common emphasis on software re-
ductive. The focus on FOSS as main empirical refer-
ence for the bazaar governance idealtype is limiting be-
cause it overemphasizes the production and develop-
ment of software over its deployments, actual usages in 
practice, and remarkable influence that maintainers 
like miners exercise. Because of their functioning as 
long term immutable ledgers, blockchains cannot be 
designed, deployed, maintained, nor understood with-
out considering their actual use and the tensions they 
generate in real-life settings. Those phenomena mani-
fest only at scale and when real interests are involved.  
Lustig and Nardi [26] pose special attention onto 
algorithms as defining aspect of Bitcoin, whereas we 
argue that ledger’s maintainers and tokens’ users are 
what characterize the governance of blockchain as 
much as the other governance purposes it can be used 
for. Indeed, beyond software development, the authen-
ticity of the ledger is what maintainers guarantee and 
users rely upon. Authenticity is not a straight product 
of algorithms, but a sustained long-term effort that all 
involved parties contribute to and depend upon. Be-
yond software developers, miners (or whoever main-
tains the ledger) and traders (or whoever uses the to-
kens for the most diverse purposes) gained a prominent 
role in governance. These peculiarities (authentication 
vs. infinite replicability, actual use at scale, long-term 
timeframe) prompted us to propose ‘tribal governance’ 
as a new mode of governance, and to outline its corner-
stones. 
The broader and distributed resources that tribal 
governance relies upon and shapes is not accounted for 
by the bazaar idealtype and its sole focus on produc-
tion, copyleft, and transaction cost. More precisely, the 
digitalization of authentication functions usually per-
formed by organizations reveals some limitations of 
the bazaar idealtype (see also table 1 above): 
• Rivalry originates a sense of togetherness which 
FOSS does not have because exiting/forking is far 
less damaging (at the same time this is not a ‘net-
work’ in Powell’s terms because identities are not 
fixed and membership is volatile); 
• Its low control intensity does not apply because, even 
if it remains true that blockchain software can be eas-
ily modified as any other FOSS, those changes are 
not relevant for authentication until they substitute 
the current software version run by miners and users; 
• Thus, copyleft may affect but does not define block-
chain-related governance and its capacity to mobi-
lize human and technical resources, and also to com-
mit them over long periods of time; 
• Rather than as always under development product, 
blockchains are better conceptualized as a means of 
governance for what they authenticate and how. 
These peculiar characteristics of blockchain gov-
ernance, which diverges from the bazaar but does not 
fall back into Powell’s threefold categorization sub-
stantiate our proposal for the ‘tribal governance’ 
idealtype. Reasons for referring to tribes are: they use 
to have their own mode of governance which is not de-
fined by the rule of law and enforced by states within 
their territory; despite own rule, they use to interact 
with societies regulated by formal laws, whose territo-
ries they often cross; they have charismatic chiefs but 
the boundaries between inside and outside the tribe are 
often vague [57].  
Tribal governance can be well illustrated by land 
registries. Swan [31], as much as our interviewees, are 
aware that deploying blockchains as reliable records 
for decades-long periods is not only a matter for soft-
ware whose code is freely accessible in the future. In 
fact, providing the required time longevity of records is 
about ensuring from the beginning the persistence of a 
functioning consensus mechanism (including hashing 
power, stakes, etc. depending on the blockchain type). 
Needless to say, compromised records would be cata-
strophic for national land and real estate records, with 
so much of the economy anchored to them. In sum, 
trust needs to be built far beyond software itself and its 
code availability. In the cases of blockchains for land 
registries, faceless trust needs to relate to identifiable 
properties. Usually, notaries and state officers are in 
charge of it. This raises up the questions of liability: if 
there is no unique responsibility, who is liable when 
something goes wrong? The awareness of those risks 
manifests in the cases above, whose blockchains are 
both linked to Bitcoin’s -by far the most reliable block-
chain because its size and track record- and state rec-
ords. However, this induces conflicts between modes 
of governance: trust in the crowd (or better in the 
‘tribe’) may not align with trust in the state (‘hierar-
chy’). If in 20 years an immutable blockchain records 
a different owner for a piece of land than an old paper 
certificate, what would a judge trust? What has legal 
standing? 
Descending from this sort of problems, it catches 
the attention that bureaucracies -certainly a manifesta-
tion of hierarchical governance- are traditionally in 
charge of authentication. This raises the interesting 
question of how their functioning encounters and col-
lides with blockchain tribal governance, which prom-
ises to perform the same function but relies on a possi-
bly incompatible governance mode. Some of the as-
pects of this encounter emerge from the Estonian pro-
ject of providing identity authentication also to non-Es-
tonians, and even an own cryptocurrency Estcoin, rely-
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ing on blockchain [36]. The Estonian e-residency initi-
ative [36] raises concerns regarding identity authenti-
cation and the possible consequences of displacing re-
sponsibilities. This is in line with the call for individual 
accountability [5, 6]. Our initial empirical work 
showed that the interactions between existing authori-
ties and blockchain records are far from settled. For in-
stance, there is no full scale and routinized land regis-
tration relying on blockchains. Rather, specific dis-
putes are recorded on pilot blockchains in case they can 
help court cases. This is particularly interesting in 
countries based on the common law, where courts leg-
islate through precedents. 
Comparing bureaucracy and blockchain-based au-
thentication, one can see remarkable differences. Espe-
cially important appear to be those about relying on pri-
vate resources for providing a service of general inter-
est (see Morabito [39]). It is certainly a concrete risk 
that, if in the future public and private interests di-
verged, there would be no mandate nor legal basis to 
force a faceless tribe of actors to act in the public inter-
est. Since blockchain users, like skillful internet users 
more generally, may operate with some level of ano-
nymity across jurisdictions, bureaucracies are in short 
of fit-for-purpose tools. Here the famous internet motto 
“We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe 
in: rough consensus and running code” points to a 
mode of governance of an open-ended aggregate of ac-
tors –rather than of a defined citizenry/body politic – 
through consensus. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In our study, we propose and characterize a new 
type of governance – tribal governance, which emerges 
from adoption of blockchain technology. 
In any case we should not be deterministic in as-
suming what decentralized architectures imply and re-
quire. Agre [58], referring to the previous wave of peer-
to-peer architectures originated with file sharing, instils 
the reasonable doubt that decentralized architectures do 
not necessarily match with decentralized institutions 
and vice versa. Especially, decentralization may not 
necessarily lead to equality in practice. In fact, most 
open projects (like the Web, Wikipedia, P2P, FOSS) 
showed remarkable tendencies to centralization over 
time [59]. This is certainly possible for blockchain and, 
for instance, Bitcoin mining shows a clear centraliza-
tion in China where estimates place 2/3 of computing 
power. 
Also, following our criticism of overemphasis on 
algorithms alone, ‘Code is law’ – echoing Lessig’s 
book [60] – may not to apply to law in the traditional 
sense of defining what is right or wrong. Long-term 
consequences in governance remain largely unpredict-
able, especially where state authorities cannot be taken 
for granted. In prospect, reliable records promise to ex-
clude unreliable authorities, thus reallocating else-
where some traditional functions of hierarchies, mar-
kets and networks. 
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